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According to the triadic neurocognitive model of addiction to drugs (e.g., cocaine) and
non-drugs (e.g., gambling), weakened “willpower” associated with these behaviors is
the product of an abnormal functioning in one or more of three key neural and cognitive
systems: (1) an amygdala-striatum dependent system mediating automatic, habitual, and
salient behaviors; (2) a prefrontal cortex dependent system important for self-regulation and
forecasting the future consequences of a behavior; and (3) an insula dependent system for
the reception of interoceptive signals and their translation into feeling states (such as urge
and craving), which in turn plays a strong influential role in decision-making and impulse
control processes related to uncertainty, risk, and reward. The described three-systems
account for poor decision-making (i.e., prioritizing short-term consequences of a decisional
option) and stimulus-driven actions, thus leading to a more elevated risk for relapse. Finally,
this article elaborates on the need for “personalized” clinical model-based interventions
targeting interactions between implicit processes, interoceptive signaling, and supervisory
function aimed at helping individuals become less governed by immediate situations and
automatic pre-potent responses, and more influenced by systems involved in the pursuit
of future valued goals.
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INTRODUCTION
Once an individual has lost control over drug or non-drug
(e.g., gambling) use, rising negative consequences do not necessar-
ily lead to any adjustment in their maladaptive choices and actions
(1). Reasons for the transition from controlled use to addiction
are numerous and include individual vulnerabilities in attention,
reward, emotion, decision-making, self-regulation, pain, and stress
[for a review, see Ref. (2)]. Additional reasons include the neuro-
toxic and neuroadaptive effects of drugs and withdrawal on the
central nervous system [e.g., Ref. (3)].
Historically, the research on addiction has attracted studies that
focus on only one neural system at a time. For instance, during
the 1980s, the research focused on the role of the striatum and
mesolimbic dopamine system, as well as the amygdala, in drug
reward [e.g., see Ref. (4) for a review]. During the 1990s, the pre-
frontal cortex attracted most of the research on addiction, and its
role in various mechanisms of decision-making and impulse con-
trol. More recently, there has been a rising interest in the role of
the insular cortex in addiction [e.g., Ref. (4, 5)]. In an attempt to
unify the concept of addiction that integrates both experimental
and clinical perspectives, we present here the triadic neurocogni-
tive model of addiction, which takes into account all the neural
systems that have been implicated historically in the neurobiol-
ogy of addiction, including “willpower,” the ability to self-control,
and the capacity to choose according to long-term, rather than
short-term, outcomes [see also (6)]. We argue that in addiction
to drugs (e.g., cocaine) and non-drugs (e.g., gambling), the weak-
ened “willpower” associated with most addictive behaviors is the
product of an abnormal functioning in the interaction between
three key neural and cognitive systems: (a) an amygdala-striatum
dependent neural system, which promotes automatic cognitions
and habitual actions; we have referred to this neural system as the
“impulsive” system, and it becomes hyperactive in states of addic-
tion; and (b) a prefrontal cortex dependent neural system, which
is important for decision-making, forecasting the future conse-
quences of a behavior, and inhibitory control and self-awareness;
we have referred to this neural system as the “reflective” system,
and it may become hypoactive in states of addiction; and (c) the
insular cortex, which plays a key role in modulating the dynamics
between the“impulsive”and“reflective”systems. More specifically,
the (anterior) insula is important for translating bottom-up, inte-
roceptive signals into subjective experiences (e.g., craving), which
in turn potentiates the activity of the impulsive system, and/or
weakens or hijacks the goal-driven cognitive resources needed for
the normal operation of the reflective system. At the cognitive
level, the characteristics of the impulsive and reflective neural sys-
tems mirror those from the dual-processing accounts; one is fast,
automatic, and unconscious and the other is slow, deliberative,
and conscious (7–9). Automatic or poorly controllable processes
include what has been addressed in the literature as biased atten-
tion processing toward addiction-related cues (e.g., a bottle of
beer, a slot machine, a syringe), implicit memory associations (e.g.,
alcohol-pleasant associations), and approach/avoidance responses
to addiction-related cues (10). However, habits and impulsive
behaviors can be brought under control by controlled processes
related to goal-directed actions, at least to some extent. These
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automatic processes can be modified through the engagement of
self-regulation processes. In case of addictive behaviors, a num-
ber of executive functions either cool (e.g., working memory) or
hot (e.g., redirecting attention from addiction- to non-addiction-
related cues, inhibiting addiction-related pre-potent responses)
are viewed as compromised and unable to exert an effective control
of behaviors elicited by automatic processes [e.g., Ref. (11)].
While this dual-process model may explain many aspects of
complex decision-making, self-control, and “willpower” to resist
the temptation of addictive stimuli, we argue that the model is not
sufficient to explain all aspects of addictive behaviors, especially
those related to deprivation from the reward stimulus or with-
drawal, stress, anxiety, and other homeostatic disturbances. For
example, while an individual with alcoholism may manage to exert
self-control over his or impulse to have a drink for a period of time,
the mere sight of a bottle, or experiencing a stressful situation, can
throw this control completely out of balance,and the old automatic
and habit systems take over. We argue that this drastic weakening
of control systems brought about by changes in the internal body
state of the organism play a key role in modulating the strengths
of impulsive and reflective systems, and incorporating this influ-
ential role of internal states is not part of the dual-process models.
For this reason, we propose a key role for a third neural sys-
tem, namely the insula [e.g., see its role in nicotine dependence,
(12)]. The insula is viewed as a “gate” system involved in the way
a person feels at a particular point in time, which responds to
homeostatic perturbations (13), and in turn modulates the inter-
action between these two systems, i.e., the impulsive and reflective
systems (4, 5, 14). Specifically, engagement of the insula exacer-
bates activity of the impulsive system and hijack activity of the
reflective system; thus creating a severe imbalance between the
two. At the neuroanatomic level, strong afferent projections con-
nect the insula to the ventral striatum (15). In addition, insular
hyperactivity during addiction-related cue exposure may result in
compromising self-control efficiency. In light of well-documented
links between stressor exposure and addiction-related experiences
(e.g., relapse), stressor exposure modulate cue reactivity to drug
cues [for a review, see Ref. (16)] and thus may dramatically impact
the balance between the impulsive and reflective systems. Besides,
the imbalance found in individuals struggling with their com-
pulsive behaviors often accompanies blunted sensitivity to non-
drug rewards (17); thus making addiction-related activities highly
attractive.
Finally, in this article, we will elaborate on clinical model-based
interventions targeting implicit processes, interoceptive process-
ing, and supervisory functioning aimed at helping individuals
become less governed by immediate situations and automatic pre-
potent responses, and more influenced by systems involved in the
pursuit of future valued goals. We argue that this pathway may
restore some kind of “free will,” thus making the initiation and
the maintenance of a change process of addictive behaviors more
likely and more effective.
THE IMPULSIVE SYSTEM, AND ITS IMPLICIT COGNITIVE
DETERMINANTS OF ADDICTIVE BEHAVIORS
Over the course of the development of an addiction, related behav-
iors become progressively controlled by addiction-associated
information that have acquired, through Pavlovian and instru-
mental learning mechanisms, the property to automatically elicit
substance-related (or gambling) actions (18, 19). In this section,
we describe some neural and cognitive properties of what we have
called “impulsive system,” and focus on some of its properties that
are associated with addictive behaviors.
These fast and poorly deliberated responses triggered by com-
petent cues present in the environment (e.g., the view of a
bottle of beer by a drinker) depend on basal ganglia neural cir-
cuits (20). Critically, the amygdala-striatal (dopamine dependent)
neural system is a key structure for the incentive motivational
effects of a variety of non-natural rewards (e.g., psychoactive
drugs) and natural rewards (e.g., food) (21). This stimulus bound
rigid and automatic-habit decision-making system requires lit-
tle mental elaboration (22), and it is modified by drugs, alcohol,
and gambling through changes in the phasic characteristics of
dopamine activity in reward signaling, and the tonic function
of dopamine levels in permitting and facilitating a large variety
of motor and cognitive functions (23, 24). Increased mesolim-
bic dopamine activity, stimulated by drugs of abuse, reinforces
the repetition of behaviors, influencing learning and attentional
processes, and the strengthening of associations of reinforcing
effects (10, 25, 26). Through intensive practice and operant con-
ditioning processes, instrumental performance (e.g., a rat pressing
a lever to receive cocaine) could easily switch from goal-directed
action-outcome associations, which requires a representation of
the outcome as a goal, to actions more independent of the current
value of the goal (27); thus characterizing a state of compulsiv-
ity (28). The transition between goal-directed and compulsive
behaviors was associated with specific aspects of synaptic struc-
tural plasticity in both dorsal (29–31) and ventral striatal regions
(31). This transition process is accelerated by the sensitization of
dopaminergic systems (32). At the cognitive processing level, the
impulsive system processes information automatically/implicitly,
which describes a number of properties such as goal independence,
absence of intentionality, uncontrollability, lack of awareness of
one or more aspects of the process (e.g., stimuli, origins, attrib-
utes, behavioral effects), efficiency (effectiveness under processing
load), and operation even under time constraints (33).
A vast literature has investigated the relationship between auto-
matic/implicit processes and behaviors and reached the conclusion
that those processes could modify action in the absence of any
decision (34). For instance, in experiments investigating priming
effects, participants who were primed with words such as “wrin-
kles” or “gray” walked more slowly when leaving the experiment
(35). In this case, one could expect that conscious deliberation be
not impacted by this experimental condition; thus highlighting a
direct implicit cognition/action pathway. In other cases, viewing a
beer advertisement in the television may result in making the deci-
sion to go to the fridge and grasping a beer, it seems reasonable to
posit that some automatic processes resulted in biasing the deci-
sion possibly through the signaling of the immediate rewarding
aspects of the experience (e.g., pleasant taste of the beer), some-
times at the detriment of differed consequences (e.g., fatigue). In
line with this idea, is the experiment showing that altering the
effort required to reach foods by manipulating their proximity
can increase the selection of easier-to-reach food options (36).
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With respect to drug use and gambling, addiction-related cues are
progressively flagged as salient and grab the addicts’ attention (i.e.,
attentional bias) (37). The attentional processing of such stim-
uli trigger implicit “wanting” and generate automatic approach
behaviors (10).
Addicts exhibit a modified attentional processing for addiction-
relevant stimuli (25). These attentional biases occur at both early
and later levels of attentional processing, that is, at both automatic,
and at more conscious and deliberate, levels (37). Indeed, early
level of attentional processing (e.g., attentional encoding; initial
orientation of attention) depends primarily on automatic-habit
processes (38, 39), whereas later attentional processes (i.e., main-
tenance of attention; disengagement of attention) involve higher
level of conscious control processes (39). Attentional bias at the
level of attentional encoding has been studied with the attentional
blink (AB) paradigm (40). The AB phenomenon refers to the
observation that the second of two-masked targets (T1 and T2),
which appears in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) stream
of distracters, is usually poorly identified when it is presented
within a short time interval after T1 [e.g., within a several 100 ms;
(40)]. Using this task, recent studies [e.g., Ref. (41, 42)] have shown
that, in addicts, addiction-related words were less affected by inter-
ference of other RSVP items within a short time interval after
T1, as compared with neutral words. These results suggest that
individuals suffering from addiction are more likely to identify
addiction-related words than neutral words under conditions of
limited attentional resources, which is consistent with an enhanced
attentional bias for addiction cues at the encoding level. Atten-
tional bias at the engagement and the maintenance/disengagement
levels of attention has been highlighted through the monitoring
of eye-movements during performance of attentional tasks [for
a review, see Ref. (37)]. For instance, using a change detection
task, Brevers et al. (43) showed that, compared with their con-
trols, problem gamblers were faster to detect gambling-related
than neutral-related stimulus change. In addition, these investi-
gators observed that problem gamblers directed their first eye-
movements (i.e., attentional engagement) more frequently toward
gambling-related than toward neutral stimuli, exhibited more gaze
fixation counts (i.e., attentional maintenance) on gambling stim-
uli and spent more time looking (i.e., attentional maintenance) at
gambling-related than neutral stimuli.
Implicit addiction-related association refers to spontaneous
associations between addiction-related cues and affective, arousal,
motivational representation in memory. This association tends
to reveal automatic, impulsive cognitive-motivational mental
processes, which are sparsely independent of, or not available
to, conscious awareness (10). In other words, implicit association
could be defined as an introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately
identified) trace of past experience that mediate feeling, thought,
or action (44). The Implicit Association Task [IAT; Ref. (45)] is
a paradigm commonly used to assess implicit association. In a
typical IAT, stimuli belonging to one of four possible categories
are presented one by one on a computer screen. On each trial,
participants categorize as fast as they can the presented stimulus
by pressing one of two keys. The assumption underlying the IAT
effect is that two concepts that are more closely related in memory
should facilitate responses (faster responses and less errors) when
they share the same response key, and impair responses when they
do not share the same response key. Hence, they should be faster
in the first categorization than in the second. For instance, when
classifying names of alcohol or soft drinks (i.e., target stimuli),
and positive or negative words (i.e., attribute stimuli), people who
hold stronger alcohol-positive affect associations than soft drink
positive affect associations should be faster when alcohol and pos-
itive words are assigned to one key, and soft drinks and negative
words to the second key, when compared to the condition in which
soft drinks and positive words are assigned to one key, and alcohol
and negative words to the other. Using this task, researches have
shown that appetitive associations (i.e., positive, arousal) predict
alcohol and substance use (46). For instance, Thush and Wiers
(47) observed that positive affect and arousal associations predict
the level of drinking in adolescents for the following year.
In addition to attentional bias and implicit association,
prominent addiction models posit that automatically activated
approach/avoidance tendencies play a critical role in addition.
Indeed, the repetition of addiction-related behaviors elicits auto-
matic approach tendencies toward addiction-related cues (10).
Several paradigms have been developed to assess this action
tendency. Consider, for example, the stimulus-response compat-
ibility task (48), in which participants are instructed, in one
block, to move a manikin (i.e., a little man) as fast as they can
toward substance-related pictures, and away from neutral pictures
(approach substance block). In another block, the task is to move
the manikin away from the substance-related pictures and toward
neutral pictures (avoid substance block). Through this task, sub-
stance abusers (alcohol, cigarettes, marijuana) exhibited relatively
fast approach movements toward substance cues (48–50). Hence,
by highlighting that addiction-related cues automatically trigger a
corresponding impulse, which consists of a behavioral schema to
approach it (10), these studies provide strong evidence for the
presence of automatic incentive habits in gambling addiction.
However, it is important to realize that these tendencies are likely
to be highly malleable and context-dependent. For instance, unlike
controls, abstaining alcohol-dependent patients revealed a relative
avoidance bias rather than relative approach bias and moreover,
relapse rates were found to increase as the relative tendency to
avoid alcohol increased (51).
Altogether, these cognitive aspects are consistent with the
incentive-sensitization theory (19, 52), which suggests that,
through repetition of rewarding appetitive experiences, the degree
to which addiction-related objects are “wanted,” desired, and their
effect anticipated, increases disproportionately when compared
with the degree to which they are “liked” (i.e., the actual mood
change), and this dissociation may progressively increase with the
development of addiction. In addition to the increased salience
attributed to cues that predict drug reward, addiction is character-
ized by relatively reduced sensitivity to natural rewards (17, 53),
as seen for instance in cocaine abusers for whom non-addiction
rewards generate below normal mesocorticolimbic neural activa-
tions as compared to monetary reward (54). Also, while occa-
sional smokers show greater neural responses to money than
cigarettes, dependent smokers react equally across conditions (55).
We should note here that money reward may be exchanged for
smoking or drugs or any other addictive stimulus. For this reason
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monetary reward seems to exert strong neural responses. Most
importantly, addictive stimuli acquire a strong incentive moti-
vational salience (e.g., Robinson and Berridge), which renders it
highly more preferable to any other type of reward (except money).
This increased reward salience is also evident in animal paradigms.
While novelty serves as a strong reward stimulus in animals, those
animals that become exposed to drugs begin to prefer the choice of
the drug instead of the novelty (56), and even instead of maternal
behavior (57), or food (58).
THE REFLECTIVE SYSTEM AND ITS SUPERVISORY
FUNCTIONS IN ADDICTION
While the habit (or impulsive) system, which is key to generating
at least the “wanting” component to seek reward, may explain one
important aspect of the behaviors associated with approach behav-
iors, it is clear that it does not explain how one does control his or
her behavior. This function refers to the action of what we called
the “reflective system,” which is necessary to control these more
basic impulses, particularly when the behavior may not be opti-
mal or advantageous, or is perceived as the incorrect thing to do;
and it disallows a more flexible pursuit of long-term goals (17).
In this section, we review some evidence showing that addicted
individuals have abnormalities in this system and have difficul-
ties in exercising willpower to resist the habits and temptations
associated with their compulsive actions.
Self-control can be estimated through the capacity to inhibit
pre-potent motor responses. This process refers to the ability to
deliberately suppress dominant, automatic responses that are no
longer relevant or required. This type of inhibitory control can be
indexed by the stop-signal [e.g., Ref. (59)] and go/no-go tasks [e.g.,
Ref. (60)], which require the subject to withhold simple motor
responses when a stop-signal occurs (stop-signal task), or when
a no-go stimulus is presented (go/no-go task). Impaired response
inhibition performance has been previously highlighted in addicts
by using the stop-signal task (i.e., prolonged latency of motor
response inhibition), and the go/no-go paradigm (i.e., more errors
of commission: subject had to withhold a response but pressed
a button instead) [for a review of response inhibition impair-
ment in gambling, opiate, and alcohol addiction, see respectively
(17, 61, 62)]. Moreover, results from several brain imaging studies
showed that, in drug addicts (63, 64), impaired performance on
response inhibition tasks is associated with a hypoactivation in the
anterior cingulate cortex, implicated in mechanisms of error detec-
tion, and conflict monitoring. Several studies also reported intact
response inhibition in addicts [e.g., Ref. (65, 66)]. Nevertheless,
this absence of behavioral difference is not necessarily indicative
of intact response inhibition processes. For instance, van Holst
et al. (67) observed increased dorsolateral and anterior cingulate
cortex activity in pathological gamblers who exhibited a similar
behavioral performance as their controls on motor response inhi-
bition. In other words, a more effortful strategy (i.e., higher brain
activation) was undertaken in pathological gamblers to perform
at a similar level as their controls (67). Importantly, disruption
in response inhibition processes could lead to abnormal salience
attribution directed at addiction-related cues in addicts. In other
words, a dysfunction of the inhibitory control system could further
exacerbate automatic impulsive processes. For instance, implicit
memory associations are a strong predictor of alcohol use in
young adults with poor ability of motor response inhibition (68).
Moreover, several studies showed that response inhibition deficits
affecting drug and gambling addicted persons (69) are thought to
accelerate the course of addiction by compromising abstinence
from cocaine (70), gambling (71), nicotine (72), alcohol (73),
aggravating problem gambling (74), and by increasing attrition
from treatment (75).
The action of the “reflective” system is also crucial for choos-
ing according to long-term, rather than short-term, outcomes (6).
This function is mediated by paralimbic, medial orbitofrontal, and
ventromedial prefrontal structures involved in triggering somatic
states from memories, knowledge, and cognition, which allow
activation of numerous affective/emotional (somatic) responses
that conflict with each other; the end result is that an overall
positive or negative signal emerges (76). The impact of somatic
responses in addiction has been initially demonstrated in clin-
ical research with patient populations with damage in frontal
lobe regions as well as imaging studies that delineate the likely
neural basis of each of these functions (76–78). After damage to
the ventromedial region of the prefrontal cortex, previously well-
adapted individuals become unable to observe social conventions
and decide advantageously on personal matters (79). The nature
of these deficits revealed that the vmPFC region serves as a link
between (a) a certain category of event based on memory records
in high order association cortices to (b) effector structures that
produce an emotional response (77). Damage to the systems that
impact emotion and/or memory compromise the ability to make
advantageous decisions (79). The Iowa Gambling Task [IGT; (80)],
which was initially developed to investigate the decision-making
defects of neurological patients in real-life has been shown to tap
into aspects of decision-making that are influenced by affect and
emotion (77). This task has been regarded as the most widely
used and ecologically valid measure of decision making in this
clinical population. One of the reasons for this ecological valid-
ity is that performing advantageously on this task requires, as in
real-life, dealing with uncertainty in a context of punishment and
reward, with some choices being advantageous in the short-term
(high reward), but disadvantageous in the long run (higher pun-
ishment); other choices are less attractive in the short-term (low
reward), but advantageous in the long run (lower punishment).
Hence, the key feature of this task is that participants have to
forgo short-term benefits for long-term benefits, a process that
is presumably severely hampered in drug and gambling addicts
(1). Accordingly, performance on the IGT has been shown to be
a sensitive measure of impaired decision-making in a diversity of
neurological and psychiatric conditions (6). For instance, patients
with frontal lesions [e.g., Ref. (80–82)], individuals suffering from
substance [e.g., Ref. (83–87)] or non-substance addiction [e.g.,
Ref. (88, 89)] have demonstrated a preference for short-term gains
despite larger net losses while performing the IGT.
In sum, disrupted function of the “reflective” prefrontal cortex
could lead to impaired response inhibition and abnormal salience
attribution toward high-short-term rewards in addictive individ-
uals. This provides one explanation of addicts’ inability to resist
substance (or addiction-related behavior) seeking and taking at
the expense of non-addiction-related activities.
Frontiers in Psychiatry | Addictive Disorders and Behavioral Dyscontrol December 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 179 | 4
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Noël et al. Addiction theory and practice
NEURAL SYSTEMS THAT INTENSIFY MOTIVATION AND
WEAKEN CONTROL OF BEHAVIOR: THE INSULA
The central message of this article is that the two systems described
so far are influenced by interoceptive processes (e.g.,drug cravings)
(see Figure 1).
At the heart of this phenomenon is the insula in which acti-
vation in craving paradigms is a reliable observation (5, 90).
However, before discussing further about the specific role of the
insula, one should keep in mind that the insula does not work
in isolation in the brain, and that in the case of a craving for
a certain drug, other regions are activated in cue-reactivity and
drug-craving paradigms [for a review, see, Ref. (90)]. These data
are in line with the proposal of the present article, which suggests
that the insula is connected to brain-related impulsive (amygdalar
striatal complex) and reflective (prefrontal cortex) systems; and it
modulates their impact on decision and action (4).
The insular cortex has recently emerged as a key neural struc-
ture that plays a key role in the formation of interoceptive rep-
resentation, which is crucial for subjective emotional feelings (5,
13, 91). Interoception refers to the practice of receiving, process-
ing and integrating body-relevant signals with external stimuli of
affect on-going motivated behavior (13). According to the notion
of embodiment, high-level cognitive and affective processing is
grounded in the organism’s sensory and motor experiences (92).
Moreover, it has recently been argued that the insular cortex may
contribute to the onset and maintenance of addiction by trans-
lating interoceptive signals into what one subjectively experiences
as a feeling of desire, anticipation, or urge leading to approach
behaviors (5, 14, 93). Indeed, highly embodied experience may
overwhelm the cognitive control system by providing a highly
emotional experience. But also, low levels of embodied experience
may not engage the cognitive control system to adjust on-going
behavior, which may result, for instance, in high risk-taking (14).
Imaging studies show activity within the insula correlating
with the subjects’ rating of urge for cigarettes, cocaine, alco-
hol, and heroin (5, 13, 93). In addition, insula activation was
closely associated with higher levels of nicotine dependence (94)
and both attentional bias and the risk of relapse (95). Indeed,
smokers at risk for relapse showed more insula activation while
processing smoking-related words (95). In individuals with depen-
dence to cocaine, hyperactivity to drug-specific stimuli contrasts
with abnormally low activity when self-regulation processes are
engaged [e.g., inhibition; (96)].
Other evidence supporting the important role of the insula
in addiction processes arise from human brain lesion studies.
Strokes that damage the insular cortex tend to literally wipe out the
urge to smoke in some individuals previously addicted to cigarette
smoking (12). In this study, smokers with brain damage involving
the insula were more likely to quit smoking easily and imme-
diately, without relapse and without a persistent urge to smoke
(12). These results support a novel conceptualization of one of
the mechanisms by which the insula participates in maintaining
addiction.
The insular cortex (and most likely the anterior insula)
responds to interoceptive signals (due to homeostatic imbal-
ance, deprivation state, stress, sleep deprivation, etc.). Besides the
translation of these interoceptive signals into what may become
subjectively experienced as a feeling of “urge” or “craving,” we
hypothesize that the insular cortex activity increases the drive and
motivation to smoke (or take drugs or to gamble) (a) by sensi-
tizing or exacerbating the activity of the habit/impulsive system;
and (b) by subverting attention, reasoning,planning,and decision-
making processes to formulate plans for action to seek and procure
cigarettes or drugs (97). Put differently, these interoceptive repre-
sentations have the capacity to “hijack” the cognitive resources
necessary for exerting inhibitory control to resist the temptation
to smoke or use drugs by disabling (or “hijacking”) activity of the
prefrontal (control/reflective) system.
Stress could be a critical candidate for understanding the impact
of abnormal level of proprioception on impulsive and reflective
systems (98, 99). Indeed, whereas at low to moderate levels of
stress, the reflective system’s activity may be enhanced, abnormally
high levels of stress tend to attenuate activity within the reflective
system (99). This may be applied to alcohol use by successfully
inducing drug craving in the laboratory through the generation of
stress (e.g., 5-min individualized guided imagery exposure of each
FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of the triadic model of addictive behaviors.
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participants’ own recent stressful scenarios) (100). Research has
emphasized the existing association between exposure to stress,
abnormal persistent level of changes in the body state (heart rate,
salivary cortisol levels), persistent craving, and use of compulsive
individuals’ preferred drug [for a review, see Ref. (101)]. Interest-
ingly, alcoholics’ prefrontal and striatal-limbic regions (including
the insula) are hyper-responsive to neutral-relaxing condition,
making activation pattern between neutral relaxed and stressful
cues indistinguishable (102). This result suggests a dysregulated
response to stress that induces craving and increases the risk of
relapse in alcoholics (101).
THE IMPACT OF POOR METACOGNITION ON ADDICTIVE BEHAVIORS
Recent theoretical accounts (17, 103) advance that a dysfunction
of the interoceptive system may also hamper self-awareness, which
could take the form of failure to recognize an illness (i.e., lack
of insight). Indeed, perceived need for treatment concerns only
a minority of individuals suffering from addiction (104), which
might reflect dysfunction in cognitive processes and the neural
circuits underlying self-awareness (103). The underestimation of
the addiction severity might drive these individuals’ excessive drug
use, where control of use becomes exceedingly deregulated.
Impaired insight ability could be estimated through the eval-
uation of metacognition capacity, which refers to our ability to
discriminate correct from incorrect performance. The presence
of impaired metacognitive capacities in substance addiction has
received support from previously identified dissociations between
subjective and objective markers of behavior in addicted indi-
viduals (54, 105–111). For example, Brevers et al. (105) showed
that pathological gamblers were impaired in their capacity to
evaluate accurately the quality of their decisions during an arti-
ficial grammar-learning paradigm, in which the quality of choice
remains uncertain throughout the task. Specifically, after each trial
of this task, participants had to indicate how confident they were in
their grammaticality judgments. Results showed that, by contrast
with their controls, there was no correlation between pathological
gamblers’ grammaticality judgments and their level of confidence,
which suggests a disconnection between performance and confi-
dence in pathological gamblers. Additional evidences for lowered
metacognitive capacities in addicts comes from a study by Hester
et al. (109) who observed diminished commission error awareness
during a go/no-go response inhibition task in chronic cannabis
users. In addition, these authors observed that the insensitivity
of chronic cannabis users to detect errors was associated with
the absence of right insula activity during unaware errors (when
compared with aware error activity). Furthermore, lower levels of
insula activity were correlated with higher levels of recent cannabis
use, and higher levels of cannabis craving were associated with
poor error-awareness rates. These results are in line with hypothe-
ses suggesting that insula dysfunction may contribute to impaired
interoceptive awareness and heightened experience of drug-related
urges, potentially at the expense of other interoceptive signals nec-
essary for advantageous decision-making and the ability to learn
from errors (13, 112).
Other studies have also observed dissociations between sub-
jective and objective markers of performance when they were
separated in time, i.e., when subjects were asked to evaluate their
overall performance after completing the experimental task in
its entirety (54, 108, 111). For instance, Goldstein et al. (54,
108) observed that healthy control participants showed incentive-
related performance enhancements during a sustained attention
task, and that these improvements in performance correlated
with their self-reports of task engagement. These same correla-
tions did not reach significance in the cocaine subjects. More-
over, these investigators observed that healthy control subjects,
but not cocaine subjects, showed significant correlations between
monetary-driven P300 amplitudes and their respective behavioral
performance responses (108). More recently, Moeller et al. (111)
showed that, in cocaine addicted individuals, there was a poor
correspondence between the most selected picture category on
a probabilistic choice task (that assessed objective preference for
viewing four pleasant, unpleasant, neutral, and cocaine pictures)
and self-reported most chosen picture category (ascertained at the
conclusion of the probabilistic task).
Finally, additional studies have also focused on the impact of
diminished metacognitive capacities on addicts’ forthcoming deci-
sions or performances (106, 107, 110). For example, Le Berre et al.
(110) observed dissociations between the predictions of future
recognition performance (estimated with self-rated ability to per-
form adequately a following word-recognition task) and actual
recognition performance in alcohol-dependent individuals. More
recently, Brevers et al. (106) examined metacognitive capacities in
a sample of pathological gamblers by asking participants to wager
on their own decisions after each choice during their performance
of the Iowa Gambling Task [i.e., IGT with post-decision wagering;
Ref. (113)]. These authors observed that, unlike healthy controls,
pathological gamblers tend to wager high while performing poorly
on the IGT (i.e., choosing option featuring high rewards but higher
losses rather that options featuring low rewards and losses). This
result suggests that pathological gamblers exhibited impairments
not only in their ability to correctly assess risk in situations that
involve ambiguity, but also in their ability to correctly express
metacognitive judgments about their own performance. That is,
pathological gamblers not only perform poorly, but they also erro-
neously estimate that their performance is much better than it
actually is. In chronic cigarettes smokers, Chiu et al. (107) exam-
ined whether or not fictive prediction errors (i.e., when fictive out-
comes contradict with the expectation) during a non-active gam-
bling choice task impacted smokers’ forthcoming choice. These
authors observed that the fictive prediction error was computed
by chronic smokers (indexed by a corresponding signal change in
the ventral striatum) but did not influence their behavioral choices
(when compared with control participants). Findings from these
studies (106, 107, 110) further support hypotheses advancing that
a dissociation between objective and subjective markers may con-
tribute to impaired decision-making and the ability of failure to
learn from errors that underlies perseverative behavior.
This abnormal degree of dissociation found in addicted peo-
ple between the “object” level and the “meta” level, raised the
possibility that poor metacognition leads to poor action and
decision-making monitoring and adjustment (114). However,
much remains to be done in order to identify how different
regions of the prefrontal cortex interact with interoceptive signals
to promote accurate judgment performance and further cognitive
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control on decision-making, memory as well as on the sense of
agency in healthy participants (115) and in addicts (17). Anatomi-
cally, the insula is a primary site for receiving interoceptive signals,
but in turn the insula is connected to widespread regions of the pre-
frontal cortex, and hence this interoceptive-prefrontal interaction
may be mediated by the insula (17, 116).
LACK OF WILLPOWER IN ADDICTS; THE CHICKEN OR THE
EGG QUESTION
EFFECTS OF ACUTE DRUG ADMINISTRATION ONWILLPOWER
CAPACITIES
Evidence from cognitive and behavioral sciences has led to the idea
that acute drug primes limbic incentive neurocircuitry (striatum,
amygdala, insula, mesencephalon) while suppressing top-down
supervisory control circuits [for a review of alcohol studies, see
Ref. (117)]. Of particular interest is the altered capacity to detect
and resolve errors made on a variety of cognitive tasks [for a review,
see Ref. (62)] and also, when subjects are given alcohol, they tend
to take more risks which parallels increased activation in the stria-
tum to risky compared with safe choices and the neural response
to notification of both wins and loses are dampened throughout
NAcc, caudate, thalamus, and insula (118).
In addition, emotional processing could be dramatically altered
after the ingestion of some drinks as illustrated by some recent
studies showing a lack of amygdala (119) and of insula (120)
recruitment by threat-indicating faces during alcohol intoxication;
thus making threatening and uncertain outcomes in social context
less of a moderator in inebriated participants.
Together, research on the acute effects of drugs on brain and
cognitive processes is compatible with the idea that it compro-
mises one or more of these brain systems discussed in the present
paper, a disruption that may prevent the efficient exercise of
willpower. However, in most of the studies, these brain abnormal-
ities are not associated with abnormal behavioral pattern (e.g., low
working memory performance) [but see Ref. (121) for abnormal
both pattern of activation and behavior consecutively of alcohol
ingestion], thus raising the question of the significance of these
hypo-/hyper-activation found in neuroimaging studies [see (117)
for a discussion of this issue]. Although not demonstrated yet,
one could expect that these brain changes would be more sensitive
measures than behavioral ones (122), which is likely to become
abnormal on more demanding tasks.
VULNERABILITIES IN THE DECISION PROCESS AND THE RISK OF
ADDICTION
Vulnerability to substance use and gambling disorders encom-
passes multiple dimensions of the individual’s life, ranging from
biological factors to broader environmental and cultural variables
[e.g., Ref. (123)]. Particularly sensitive is the period of adolescence
starting with the biological changes of puberty and ending with the
time at which the individual attains a stable, independent role in
society. During this period decision-making is increasingly inde-
pendent of adult influences as well as more vulnerable because
of an enhanced taste for risk together with impulsive actions and
decisions that can sometimes lead to serious consequences. This
is a context that makes peers influence more powerful (for better
or for worse) and novel experiences more attractive. Thus one
would not be surprised to observe that adolescence is an exper-
imentation period with a number of exciting experiences, e.g.,
alcohol, drugs, and gambling. Note that initiation is not a patho-
logical process per se but sometimes it may evolve into severe
disorders (i.e., compulsive behaviors) (124). At the extreme, this
state of “inflexibility” exemplified by drug and non-drug addictive
behaviors has been thought to reflect impaired “basic” behavioral
learning processes, poor self-regulation, and impaired decision-
making [e.g., Ref. (4)]. As a consequence, “willpower” may be
too limited. Thus, one characteristic of adolescence is that the
power of positive short-term consequences of choice and behav-
iors may exceed self-regulation capacities, which can be risky to
health, yet might be normal within adolescent social development
[Ref. (125); for a review, see (126)]. Individual motivational and
regulatory responses are thought to increase the risk of alcohol
and gambling misuse in adolescents. However, individual differ-
ences presented far before the onset of puberty are also important
to understand the elevation of risk [e.g., low capacities of delay
of gratification in children at age 4 predict cocaine/crack use in
individuals vulnerable to psychosocial maladjustment, (127)]. As
another example, higher levels of impulsive behavior as early as age
3 predict aggressive behavior and drug use in adolescence (128).
Thus, the quality of pre-adolescents’ cognitive and affective func-
tioning (e.g., resisting immediate temptations) is important to
take into account in order to investigate the addictive risk in ado-
lescents (129). However, during adolescence, demanding context
(e.g., peer influence) and sensation seeking are rising dramat-
ically; thus encouraging experimentation with novel behaviors,
which also require “willpower” to prevent a number of deleterious
consequences.
It remains difficult to know whether these abnormalities are
a direct result of the toxic effects of alcohol on the brain (i.e.,
the consequence of use) or whether pre-existing brain conditions
(antecedent to the initiation of use) are present that differentiate
those who begin using at a young age form those who do not
(130). The “chicken or the egg” question has been addressed in
different ways. For instance, in adolescent girls, more drinking
days in the past year predicted a greater reduction in performance
on visuospatial memory tasks, whereas in boys, more hangover
symptoms in the year before follow-up testing predicted worsen-
ing of sustained attention (131). These results suggest that due
to neurotoxic effects, alcohol-use disorders during adolescence
(including associated withdrawal symptoms) may interfere with
normal brain maturation. However, despite increased frequency
of use over a 4-year follow-up period in a community-based
sample or early adolescents (132), working memory among par-
ticipant remained stable over the 4-year period suggesting that the
detrimental influence of increased drinking frequency on working
memory is marginal between early and mid-adolescence.
Another way to address this issue was to compare adolescents
who have no or minimal alcohol/drug exposure, but who have
a positive family history (FH) for alcoholism (FH+), to age-
matched adolescents who have a negative FH− for alcoholism.
The FH+ group is an ideal genetic-risk model, as a positive his-
tory of alcoholism is associated with an earlier onset and higher
magnitude of use as well as with a higher prevalence of alcohol-use
disorders in adolescents and young adults. The neuropsychological
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literature found mixed results regarding cognitive impairments in
FH+ prior to the initiation of alcohol consumption. Evidence
shows that FH+ youth have deficits in abstract reasoning and
planning, and they have lower IQ scores, poorer academic perfor-
mance, and slower trajectories in cognitive improvement at 1-year
follow-up when compared to FH− youth (133). However, other
studies failed to document differences between FH+ and FH−
youth. Interestingly, deficits in FH+ youth were predominantly
found in children of antisocial alcoholics (134), which may consti-
tute a critical and poorly controlled factor to explain discrepancy
across studies. In addition, the number of relatives determining
the criteria for a positive FH of substance (a single parent in some
studies, numerous in others) is also likely to explain differences
across studies. Indeed, a greater family loading of alcoholism may
be associated with a greater genetic susceptibility for developing a
substance-use disorder than a lesser degree of family loading.
From a neurobiological perspective, FH+ youth exhibit smaller
overall total brain volumes than their FH− counterparts and less
inhibitory frontal activation during the performance of a go/no-go
functional magnetic resonance imaging task, compared to FH−
comparison subjects (135). At the structural brain level, infor-
mation processing speed was correlated significantly with white
matter volume in FH− females only (136), which may indicate
that subtle abnormal cognitive/brain relationship could represent
a risk factor for substance abuse in female adolescents who have
not yet initiated drug use.
A great number of researches support the idea that higher
impulsivity, which could be defined as “actions which are poorly
conceived, prematurely expressed, unduly risky, or inappropriate
to the situation and that often result in undesirable consequences”
(137), elevates the risk of addiction in young population. For
instance, slower rates of development of behavioral self-control
strongly and specifically predict early initiation of drug use at 14-
year-old and higher number of drug-related problems at 17-years
old (138). In line with this result, impulsive/hyperactive symptoms
of ADHD in children were the stronger predictors in a prospec-
tive study for initiation of tobacco, alcohol, and illicit drug use
at 14 (139). In another group with genetic risk of addiction, the
adolescent offspring of substance-use disorder parents showed ele-
vated prevalence of alcohol-dependency and stimulant use (140).
This relationship is hypothesized to be due to impulsivity-related
endophenotype (141). In the same vein, impulsivity measures
(personality dimension of constraint) during adolescence also
significantly predict problem gambling behavior at a follow-up
assessment [e.g., Ref. (142)].
In sum, during childhood and adolescence, decrements in cog-
nitive abilities, associated with familial history of substance abuse
(and antisocial personality component and multiplex FH of alco-
holism), may be present prior to cognitive impairments that result
from early initiation and continued use of alcohol and drugs.
FROM NEUROCOGNITIVE THEORY TO CLINICAL PRACTICE
Based upon the model proposed in this article, a number of clinical
and cognitive interventions are thought to improve treatment out-
comes of addictive behaviors. These interventions generally aim at
targeting one subsystem at a time from the triadic neural system
model of willpower presented in this article. One strategy may be
fooling the impulsive system by desensitizing automatic attention
toward addiction cues, positive implicit memory associations with
addiction cues, and approach tendencies toward addictive object.
Boosting self-regulation control along with boosting metacogni-
tion and self-awareness of the cognitive limitation, and reducing
interoceptive signaling of homeostatic disturbances are also key
strategies to alter addiction-related choices and actions. Applica-
tions of some of these strategies are already taking place, such
as boosting the capacity of the reflective system through phys-
ical exercise and mindfulness, through which researchers aim to
modulate how an individual processes and integrates afferent sens-
ing from the inside of the body (14). Although interesting, we
argue that clinical interventions rooted in the qualitative descrip-
tion of abnormal interactions between the three above mentioned
systems could lead to more robust and significant changes. Impor-
tantly, our defended clinical approach considers the necessity to
adapt clinical strategies to every addicted individual. Indeed, there
is evidence showing that these participants are highly heteroge-
neous with respect to cognitive and brain determinants of their
addictive behaviors [for pathological gamblers, see Ref. (143); for
polysubstance abusers, see Ref. (144)]. For instance, the prin-
ciple of equifinality (a give end state – e.g., compulsive drug
use – can be reached by many potential pathways) is particularly
clear in case of impulsivity, a concept that encompasses a num-
ber of aspects including impulsive, reflective and proprioceptive
determinants (14, 145).
STRATEGIES AIMED AT “FOOLING” THE IMPULSIVE SYSTEM
Based on an early remarkable proposition made by MacLeod et al.
(146), one of the most widely used cognitive bias modification
targets attention approach. In this article, the detection of the
probe appearing distally from the negative information results in
attenuating the intensity of anxiety and depression reactions to
subsequent laboratory stressor as well as to stressful life events
[see, Ref. (147)] in healthy participants. When applied to alco-
hol abuse disorders, it has recently been demonstrated that, when
randomly assigned to either the attending (i.e., directing atten-
tion toward the location of alcohol-related cues) or avoiding (i.e.,
directing attention away from the location of alcohol-related cues)
condition of a modified probe task, only alcohol-dependent par-
ticipants who were required to systematically avoid alcohol cues
showed swifter therapeutic progress with discharge from the pro-
gram gaining 28 days on average and reduced risk of relapsing
(time to relapse was significantly 1.25 months longer) following
the attentional bias modification training intervention (148).
Similar findings were obtained with attempts to change
approach tendencies toward alcohol cues (149, 150). Specifically,
studies have shown that training abstinent individuals with alco-
holism to make avoidance movements in response to alcohol
pictures induced better treatment outcomes (decreased alcohol
relapse rate at 1 year follow-up) (149, 150). Importantly, older
patients and patients with a strong approach-bias profited most
from this training sessions (149). Of note, in individuals with
alcoholism, alcohol relapse rates increase as the relative tendency
to avoid alcohol increases, thus suggesting that an avoidance ori-
entation toward alcohol can potentially be harmful in clinical
samples (51).
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With regard to implicit memory bias toward addiction-related
cues (e.g., good/bad; sedative/arousal), Houben et al. (151) showed
that, following an evaluative conditioning session (in which
alcohol-related cues were consistently paired with negative stim-
uli), problem drinkers showed stronger negative implicit attitudes
toward alcohol and diminished their alcohol consumption within
a week after the evaluative conditioning session.
STRATEGIES AIMED AT BOOSTING THE “REFLECTIVE” SYSTEM
Experimental procedures aimed at improving self-regulatory
processes could also have been used to modify substance-taking
behaviors. For instance, by experimentally priming either disin-
hibited (i.e., participants were told that they should try to inhibit
responding to “Stop” stimuli if possible, but that this was less
important than rapid responding to the“Go”stimuli) or restrained
behaviors (i.e., participants were told that they should try to
respond quickly to “Go” stimuli if possible, but that this was less
important than successful inhibition on “Stop” trials) while par-
ticipants completed a Stop-Signal task, Jones et al. (152) found
that increased consumption of beer during a test phase in the “dis-
inhibition group,” as compared to the “inhibition group.” Similar
results have been found when comparing alcohol use during a
taste phase after experimentally building an association between a
“go” response and alcohol cues (by using an alcohol version of the
go/go-go task) compared with a condition in which the “no-go”
response was associated with alcohol cues (153).
As another recent important finding, Verbruggen et al. (154)
demonstrated that proactive inhibitory control may have a direct
impact on risk-taking. In this study, participants were presented
with six free-choice options on every trial. Each option was asso-
ciated with a certain amount to win; however, participants were
informed that the higher the amount, the less probable a win. In
some blocks (i.e., stop condition), in addition to gambling choice,
participants were required to stop the planned manual choice
response when an occasional signal occurred. Results indicated
that participants reduced risky gambling in the stop condition
when compared to non-stop condition. Hypothetically, the stop
condition induced a proactive motor responding, that is, a general
state of cautiousness that may have enhanced cognitive control
and in turn reduced risky decision-making. In other words, when
individuals are preparing to stop, people make proactive adjust-
ments and become more cautious in executing motor responses
(155–158), which in turn may diminish the influence of automatic,
emotionally driven processes associated with high and uncertain
rewards. Altogether, these studies advance the evidence for a “con-
trol transfer” between cognitive domains, which could open new
avenues for intervention aiming at reducing addictive behaviors in
a clinical population. Unfortunately, a recent study found that the
gain on cautiousness up to 2 h when making decisions becomes
negligible 24 h later (159). This finding underlines the need to find
better parameters of inhibition training to achieve clinical efficacy.
STRATEGIES AIMED AT CONTROLLING “URGES” AND INTEROCEPTIVE
SIGNALING
In this paper, we emphasized that the increased liability for sub-
stance use may also emerge from a highly embodied experience
through the insular cortex. This process may overwhelm the
cognitive control system by providing a highly emotionalized
experience (e.g., intense state of substance-related craving) and
by sensitizing substance abusers to the conditioning of interocep-
tive drug effects (5, 93). Therefore, these individuals might benefit
from interoception-modifying techniques, such as mindfulness
exercises, biofeedback, or interoceptive exposure therapy, in order
to train reappraisal of the significance of bodily feedback triggered
by addiction-related cues (93). In addition, because dysfunction
of the interoceptive system may also hamper self-awareness (17,
103), individuals suffering from addiction might also benefit from
intervention aiming at enhancing insight. For instance, in recently
abstinent alcohol-dependent patients, Jung et al. (160) showed that
a brief insight-related intervention (five sessions in 2 weeks; 15 min
per session aiming at promoting conscious awareness of symptoms
associated with alcohol use) enhanced participants’ level of moti-
vation to change their alcohol-related behavior. In another study,
Kim et al. (161) showed that the rate of (1-year) abstinence among
alcohol-dependent patients appears to be significantly heightened
by their post-cure level of insight. These results suggest that a high
level of insight has a positive effect on the diagnostic process, moti-
vation for treatment,and substance-related behavioral change,and
may play a critical role in the recovery process.
TRIADIC MODEL-BASED STRATEGIES
As mentioned above, the equifinality concept of addictive behav-
iors suggests the need to investigate a personalized clinical
approach instead of the standard diagnostic-based view. Con-
cretely, it is plausible that based on a cognitive assessment inves-
tigating the strength of approach tendencies triggered by either
negative emotions (negative reinforcement), positive emotions
(positive reinforcement) or both and given the individual’s effi-
ciency of supervisor functions and the contribution of a particular
state of feeling leading to drug use or behavioral addictions, one
may benefit more from boosting response inhibition control under
stress-induced and craving conditions than another who will gain
more control over his/her compulsive behaviors by undergoing
positive emotion induction while exercising inhibitory control.
For these subjects with high levels of reported craving for drugs
or gambling, it sounds reasonable to include mindfulness sessions,
which obviously alter the subjective experience,possibly by discon-
necting craving-related regions such as the insula and the ventral
striatum [for smoking craving, see Ref. (162)].
It is obvious that the assumed necessity to work on the associ-
ation of systems rather than on one single system needs a lot of
development and empirical supports. At this point, our suggestion
is supported by (1) a vast research literature showing that mal-
adaptive processes to drug and non-drug behaviors are numerous
and effect bottom-up/automatic as well and top-down/intentional
registers; (2) the high heterogeneity of clinical profiles (posi-
tive reinforcement, negative reinforcement, habits, impulsiveness,
craving intensity, automatic cue-induced reactivity, and so on) and
of cognitive determinants of these learning processes; (3) the idea
that supervisory function fluctuate over time and context (e.g.,
drug or gambling use, stress, cue exposure) [see for a discussion,
Ref. (163)].
Cognitive based interventions have already proven their effi-
cacy in reducing craving and alcohol use, delaying relapse, and
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improving therapeutic commitment. It is not clear yet which
particular combination between pharmacotherapy (e.g., naltrex-
one, acamprosate), brain stimulation, and cognitive training
best fit the different forms of addiction profiles (e.g., sensa-
tion seekers/positive reinforcement vs. harm avoidant/negative
reinforcement).
Based on the proposed triadic model, predictions of an
improved treatment strategy would be to deliver the magnetic
brain stimulation in such a way to (1) downregulate (or block)
the insula; (2) upregulate (or stimulate) the prefrontal cortex.
Upregulation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex by high fre-
quency transmagnetic brain stimulation has already demonstrated
its positive outcomes on nicotine dependence [for a review, see Ref.
(164)]. For instance, this strategy reduces the power of smoking-
related cues to elicit craving. However, a number of other brain
regions could be indirectly altered and further studies are needed
to better characterizing those motivational-related brain regions
altered by upregulation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.
CONCLUSION
The discovery of the insula as a important brain structure specifi-
cally in smoking addiction does not undermine the seminal work
generated to date on the roles of other components of the neural
circuitry implicated in addiction, and impulse control disorders
in general, especially the mesolimbic dopamine system (incentive
habit system), and the prefrontal cortex (executive control system).
Addressing the role of the insula only complements this prior work,
leading researchers to investigate how inter-connected activities
between the prefrontal cortex, the striatum-amygdala system and
the striatum accounts for distinct dimensions of clinical phenom-
enology of addictive behaviors. At the cognitive and behavioral
level, various aspects of sensitized automatic stimulus-driven pro-
cessing associated with poor self-control capacities elevate the
likelihood that a state of addiction be perpetuated, particularly
in the context of stress and of addiction-cue exposure.
With respect to clinical interventions, our recommendation is
to adapt treatments to each individual’s triadic system configura-
tion by adopting a multidimensional approach, focusing on the
interactions between automatic, intentional, and proprioceptive
cognitive processes involved in the risk of developing an addic-
tive behavior (in vulnerable populations), in the maintenance of
such behaviors (in addicted people) or in the risk of relapse (in
patients). While neuropsychological testing has advanced tremen-
dously with respect to brain areas such as the prefrontal cortex
(or measuring executive functions), there is still a great lag in neu-
ropsychological evaluation of those state-dependent systems (such
as the insula). Measuring strengths or weaknesses in these sys-
tems could be the next great advancement in neuropsychological
evaluation.
This effort will undoubtedly allow the discovery of novel ther-
apeutic approaches for treating several impulse control disorders,
including breaking the cycle of addiction.
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